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Abstract—Hash functions are widely used in authentication. In
this paper, the security of Lin et al.’s efficient block-cipher-based
hash function is reviewed. By using Joux’s multicollisions and
Kelsey et al.’s expandable message techniques, we find the scheme
is vulnerable to collision, preimage and second preimage attacks.
Some modifications are recommended to avoid those security
flaws in Lin et al.’s hash construction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic hash functions, which operate on messages
of arbitrary length and output a fixed size value, play an
important role in the network’s evolution. Due to the one-way
and uniform properties, hash functions are widely used for
authentication such as commitment scheme, integrity identifi-
cation such as source code management and digital signature.
The design of cryptographic hash functions often follows the
Merkle-Damgard (MD) construction [10], [11], which iterates
a compression function for domain extension. Under the MD
construction, the final block would combine the length of the
original message. Most popular hash functions are based on
the MD construction, such as MD4 [12], MD5 [13], SHA-0
[14] and SHA-1 [15]. In practice, one can easily choose a
well-investigated block cipher (such as DES, IDEA and AES)
to construct a compression function-the block-cipher-based
hash functions. They are more convenient to be constructed
and can be faster in applications of authentications and digital
signature than ordinary hash functions. Recent results showed
that a well-designed block-cipher-based hash function not only
can be used for authentication [6], but also can be benefit
for message authentication codes [7] in resource-constrained
environment, e.g., sensor networks, smart cards and RFID
tags. According to the execution times of the underlying block
cipher in the algorithm, block-cipher-based hash functions can
be defined by single block length (SBL) such as the PGV
hash functions [16] and double block length (DBL) such as
MDC-2 [17], Parallel-DM [18], and LOKI-DBH [19]. Still, the
recent advances in collision finding [8], [9] motivate renewed
interest in finding good ways to turn a block cipher into
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a cryptographic hash function. Instructive examples can be
found in [4], [5].
Recently, Lin et al.’s proposed a new block-cipher-based
hash function [1], which aims at building a single-block-
length hash function scheme with a higher efficiency. In Lin
et al.’s scheme, the rate of the compression function is 1/2.
They claimed that even the underlying compression function is
insecure, the scheme can be secure after iterations. Moreover,
they find that besides rate, key schedule is another very
important factor. By carefully choosing an appropriate key
schedule, the hash functions with small rate may be more
efficient than the large ones.
In this paper, we cryptanalyze Lin et al.’s scheme by using
the ideas of Joux’s multicollision attack [2] and Kelsey et al.’s
expandable message technique [3]. On one hand, we construct
2r multicollisions to find collisions and (second) preimages of
the scheme. On the other hand, by constructing expandable
messages and using fixed point technique, we indicate that
the scheme is vulnerable to second preimage attack on long
messages. The fixed point idea was first discussed in [20].
With this technique we can generate an message that can be
extended to arbitrary length without changing the resulting
hash value. More details about the attack are elaborated in
Section 3.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the definitions and properties of block-cipher-
based hash functions are reviewed. Lin et al.’s scheme is
described. The ideas of Joux’s multicollisions and Kelsey et
al.’s expandable messages are also introduced. In Section 3,
the collisions, (second) preimages attacks with multicollisions
are demonstrated. Afterward, we show a complete algorithm
of second preimage attack on long messages with expandable
messages technique. In Section 4, some modifications are
recommended to avoid those security flaws in Lin et al.’s hash
construction. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here we describe some necessary definitions and notions
which will be used in the following cryptanalysis.
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A. Hash Functions
Properties. Hash functions are one-way functions that map
arbitrary length bits to fixed size bits, often denoted by H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. A good designed hash function should
have certain computational complexity against collisions or
other brute-force attacks. Usually, a secure hash function have
three minimal properties. (In practice, more other properties
are considered.)
1) Collision resistance: An adversary should be hard to find
a pair of messages M = M ′ such that H(M) = H(M ′). This
property is often referred to as strong collision resistance.
2) Preimage resistance: Given an hash value Y , an adver-
sary should be hard to find the correspond input message M
such that Y = H(M). This concept is related to the properties
of one-way function.
3) Second preimage resistance: Given a message M , an
adversary should be hard to find another message M ′ such
that H(M ′) = H(M). This property is often referred to as
week collision resistance.
If any adversary can find collisions with less than 2n/2
work, or (second) preimage with less than 2n work, the hash
functions are not secure against collision attacks, (second)
preimage attacks, respectively.
Block-cipher-based Hash Functions. The compression func-
tions of hash functions are often built from block ciphers. A
block cipher is a permutation E : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
where k is the key length. To turn a partially one-way block
cipher into a one-way compression function, some methods
are Davies-Meyer, Matyas-Meyer-Oseas, Miyaguchi-Preneel ,
MDC-2, MDC-4, Hirose, etc. The rate gives a measure of
efficiency of a hash functions based on a certain compression
function. It is defined as the number of n bit message blocks
operated per encryption or decryption. For example, Lin et
al.’s scheme is rate 1/2.
Black-box model is a well-known security model for the
analysis of block-cipher-based hash functions. In this model,
a block cipher is randomly chosen from a set that containing
all appropriate block ciphers. An adversary can freely encrypt
and decrypt the blocks but can not access the implementation.
Generally, the complexity of finding a collision or (second)
preimage is based on the total number of queries of encryption
and decryption by the adversary.
B. Joux’s Multicollision Attack
Joux proposed a generic multicollision attack against iter-
ated hash functions [2]. In his paper, it shows that multicol-
lisions in iterated hash functions are not really harder to find
than ordinary collision. More precisely, it cost r2n/2 work to
find 2r-collisions instead of 2n(2r−1)/2r work from an ideal
hash function. On the other hand, Joux pointed out that though
it is tempting to concatenate two hash function H1||H2 to gain
more security without increasing the size of hash functions, in
fact it is not really more secure than H1 and H2 itself.
Here is the basic construction of the attack. First of all,
assuming that the output length of the hash function is n and
the size of the messages blocks is m. Let hi be the hash
chaining values, and h0 is the IV . f: {0, 1}m+n → {0, 1}n
is the compress function. C denotes a 2-collision finding
machine that can output two different messages M and M ′
such that f(hi,M) = f(hi,M
′
). Finding this collision may
use generic birthday attack or any other specified attacks based
on the weakness of f . In the following, use the machine
C to generate r pairs of messages (Mi, M ′i ) satisfying
f(hi−1,Mi) = f(hi−1,M
′
i ), i from 1 to r. We can see the
graphic description below in figure 1.
Fig. 1. Joux’s multicollision construction
After the construction, the set {m1||m2||...||mr|mi = Mi
or M
′
i , i = 1, 2, ..., r} is a 2r-collision set. All the messages
in the set are hash to the same value.
C. Second Preimages Attack with Expandable Messages
The Fixed Point Technique. In [20], Dean demonstrated a
fixed points technique on the compression functions that could
bypass the MD construction. For a compression function f
there exits fixed points h, m such that h = f(h,m). Using
fixed points, we can expand the message length to arbitrary
number of blocks without changing the resulting hash value.
The algorithm is elaborated as follows.
ALGORITHM: ConstructF ixedPointsMessage(IV )
IV is the initial value and n is the width of hash chaining
values and output.
Steps:
1) Find O(2n/2) pairs of (h,m) such that h = f(h,m)
with fixed points algorithm. Keep the paired results in
ListA = (h,m).
2) Calculate O(2n/2) times of h′ = f(IV,m′) as m′ is
an unique message block. Keep the paired results in
ListB = (h′,m′)
3) Find a collision between ListA and ListB such that
h = h′.
4) Return the message (m′||m) where m′, m are the
corresponding message block in the pairs.
To expand the resulting message, it just needs adding
sufficient message blocks m repeatedly, e.g., (m′||m||...||m).
The complexity of the algorithm is about 2n/2+1 work.
A Generic Expandable Message Technique. John Kelsey and
Bruce Schneier advocated an expandable message technique
to launch a second preimage attack on long messages [3].
In their paper, a sequence of collisions between messages of
different lengths is found, and combined together to provide a
set of messages, saying an expandable message, that covers a
wide range of different lengths without changing the resulting
intermediate hash value. For a given 2r+r+1-block message,
one can find 2r distinct second preimages by expandable
message technique with about r2n/2+1+2n−r+1 compression
function calls.
ALGORITHM: ConstructExpandableMessage(IV, r)
Construct a (r, r + 2r + 1) expandable message. q is a fixed
”dummy” message used for getting the desired length. htmp
is an intermediate hash value and is set to IV initially.
Steps:
1) Calculate r− 1 times of h = f(h, q), starting from h =
htmp.
2) Calculate 2n/2 times of f(h,m) as m is an unique mes-
sage block. Keep the paired results in ListA = (h,m).
3) Calculate 2n/2 pairs of (h′,m′) such that h′ =
f(htmp,m′). Keep the paired results in ListB =
(h′,m′).
4) Find a collision between ListA and ListB such that
h = h′. Then we can obtain the colliding messages
(m′, q||q||...||q||m) where m′, m are the corresponding
message block in the pairs and there are r−1 ”dummy”
messages. Set htmp = h(= h′).
5) Repeat the four steps above with r = r− 1 until r = 0.
To describe this algorithm more vividly, we give a schematic
representation in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. A schematic representation of constructing expandable message
The pair messages in the dash box is a resulting of the cycle
from steps1 to steps4. By extending a pair of collisions of
messages, it is easy to build a complete expandable message.
D. Lin et al.’s block-cipher-based hash
A new scheme of hash functions based on block cipher [1]
is proposed by LIN et al.. In their paper, they refer that this
hash function scheme has lower rate but higher efficiency and
can be built on insecure compression functions. Some proofs
of the security are given under black-box model and some
compress functions based on block ciphers are shown. They
also emphasis the key schedule is a more important factor that
affects the efficiency of a block-cipher-based hash function
than rate. The scheme is shown in Fig 3.
The scheme has two branches denoted by H1 and H2
respectively. The input is message M which are split into
l blocks M1, ...Ml. Two values h01, h02 are set to be the
different initial values for each branch. Here Ki is the key
of the block cipher EKi . E : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a
permutation where k is the key length in bits and n is the block
length. EK1 and EK2 denote two different and independent
permutations. hl1 and hl2 are the outputs of the two branches.
The final result is H = g(hl1||hl2) where g is a transformation.
Fig. 3. Lin et al.’s block-cipher-based hash function scheme
III. CRYPTANALYSIS ON LIN ET AL’S SCHEME
In this section, we will give a detailed cryptanalysis on
Lin et al.’s scheme. The result shows that the scheme can
not achieve the collision, preimage and second preimage
resistances.
A. Multicollision attack
Before getting started, H1 and H2 are independent hash
functions on message M with different IV s. If H1||H2 is
vulnerable to collision or (second) preimage attack, then g
can’t be collision resistant or (second) preimage resistant. For
the scheme, the optimal security level of collision and (second)
preimage resistance is 2n, 22n, respectively. However, using
Joux’s multicollision attack, we can find the collision and
(second) preimage with less complexities.
1) Collision Attack: First, using Joux’s multicollision meth-
ods to construct 2r-collision messages with r equal to n/2 on
H1. After this constructing is done, we obtain 2r messages
all hash to the same value on the H1 side. On the other
hand, since the security level of H2 for collision resistance
is 2n/2, we can, with a non-negligible probability, expect that
among the 2r(r = n/2) messages, at least two messages will
also collide in the same hash value on the H2 side. Thus we
obtain such two messages M1, M2 that H1(M1) = H1(M2)
and H2(M1) = H2(M2). In this case, M1, M2 are also
two collide messages for G. Furthermore, the probability of
success can be improved when r is bigger. Considering the
complexity of the attack, it costs r2n/2(r ≥ n/2) operations
to build multicollision on H1 side and 2n/2 operations to find
collision on H2 side. Thus, the complexity of finding collisions
on (H1||H2) is r2n/2 + 2n/2(r ≥ n/2), which is much less
than 2n.
2) Preimage and Second Preimage Attack: The best general
attack to find the preimage and second preimage of H1||H2
is operating exhaust search on the different messages until
we hit the target. Thus the security level of (second) preimage
resistance should be 22n. However, using Joux’s multicollision
construction, we can find out the preimage and second preim-
age with much less complexity, saying r2n/2+2n+2n(r ≥ n)
work. The attack works as follows.
First, using Joux’s multicollision methods to construct 2r-
collision messages with r equal to n on H1. After the
constructing is done, we obtain 2r messages all hash to the
same value hr, on the H1 side. It should be noted that
the last chaining value hr is not the same as the target
value on H1 side, denoted as h1target. In order to maps
hr to h1target, some additional search for mp should be
operated such that H1(hr,mp) = h1target. This search
costs about 2n work. Among the 2r-collision messages set
{m1||m2||...||mr||mp|mi = Mi or M ′i , i = 1, 2, ..., r}, we
expect at least one of them also matches the target value on
H2 side, with an acceptable probability. Finally, this matched
message is the preimage on H1||H2. As a consequence, it can
be applied without any change when a second preimage is
requested. Considering the complexity, it takes r2n/2 work to
build multicollision on H1, 2n work to find mp, 2n to find
preimage on H2. In total, this complexity is much less than
the optimal security level 22n.
B. Expandable message attack
In [3], a second preimage attack on long mes-
sages with expandable messages was proposed. The al-
gorithm LongMessageAttack(Mtarget) was demonstrated
thoroughly in the paper. Using this algorithm, not only a
second preimage of the same length but also many other
second preimages of different lengths are found for a given
long message. However, what we expect in the attack on
Lin et al.’s scheme is that all the second preimages are of
the same length. Thus we make some adjustment with fixed
points technique. The complete attack algorithm is elucidated
as follows.
ALGORITHM: SecondPreimageAttack(h01, r,M)
Variables:
- h01 = the initial hash value on the H1 branch;
- r ≥ n;
- M = the long target message with 2r + r + 1 blocks;
- f1 = the compression function on H1 branch;
- mtest = an expandable message by fixed point;
- htest = the hash value after fixed point message;
- M∗ = the expandable message;
- h∗ = the intermediate hash value after making the ex-
pandable message;
- Mlink = a message block used to link the expandable
message;
- mi = the ith message block of M ;
Steps:
1) Use the ConstructF ixedPointsMessage(h01) and
get (m0||m′). Set mtest = (m0||m′) and htest =
f1(h01,mtest).
2) M∗ = ConstructExpandableMessage(IV, r). h∗ =
f1(h01,M∗).
3) Find Mlink such that f1(h∗,Mlink) = hi for some r +
1 ≤ i ≤ 2r + r + 1 where hi = f1(hi−1,mi) is the
intermediate hash values.
4) For (0 ≤ j ≤ 2r − 1)
a) Output the second preimage
{mtest||M∗||Mlink||mi+1||mi+2||...||m2r+r+1}
where M∗ has i−3−j blocks and mtest has 2+j
blocks.
b) mtest = mtest||m′.
5) Among the 2r second preimages of the same length pro-
duced in the last step, we expect with a non-negligible
probability that one of them is also a second preimage
on H2 side. Finally, we find a message M
′
such that
H1(M
′
) = H1(M) and H2(M
′
) = H2(M).
Considering the complexity, it takes 2n/2+1 work for step1,
r2n/2+2n/2 work for step2, nearly negligible work for step3
with r ≥ n, 2r work respectively for step4 and step5. Thus
in total, the complexity is about r2n/2 + 2r work, less than
22n.
IV. MODIFICATIONS
The recent results on hash functions have motivated a lot
of modifications and suggestions of fixing the flaws that were
found. Here we discuss the modifications of Lin et al.’s scheme
with Luck’s wide-pipe design [5] and Biham et al.’s HAIFA
framework [21].
In Luck’s wide-pipe hash design, the internal hash value
is widen up from n bits to ω ≥ 2n bits to prevent from
finding the internal collisions. Thus every internal compression
function h′ becomes {0, 1}ω×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}ω and the last
compression function h′′ becomes {0, 1}ω → {0, 1}n. As a
result, finding the multicollision on H1 branch needs 2wor22n
work, much more than how much the original birthday attack
needs. In other words, the multicollision attack does not take
effect under the wide-pipe design. The expandable message
attack fails in a similar way.
The main idea of Biham et al.’s HAsh Iterative FrAme-
work(HAIFA) is adding the number of bits that were hashed so
far and a salt value into the compression functions, which the
chaining value is computed as hi = f(hi−1,Mi, bits, salt).
The bits value can prevent against the construction of the ex-
pandable message. The salt value is randomly chosen and not
known in advance such that an adversary can’t pre-compute
the multicollisions or the expandable message constructions
before the choosing of the salt value. This indicates that the
adversary have to transform the entire attack into an online
attack, which is more difficult.
Fig. 4. A Modificated Scheme
Figure 4 represents a modification with the solusions men-
tioned above. All the internal chaining values hi including the
initial values h0i are widen up to ω bits where ω ≥ 2n. The
counteri keeps track of the number of bits that were hashed
so far in each round. In the final round, the salt value is added
into the compression function. The block cipher Eki and the
function g should be modified accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have cryptanalyzed on Lin et al.’s efficient
block-cipher-based hash construction. By using the multicol-
lision and expandable messages techniques, our cryptanalysis
shows that Lin et al.’s construction is not secure against the
collision, preimage and second preimage attacks. The basic
idea of the attacks can be concluded as follows. Firstly, try to
find 2r collisions or (second) preimages on one branch side
(such as H1 side) with r is big enough. Then among the 2r
messages we can expect a collision or a (second) preimage
with a non-negligible probability on the other branch. This
attack can be applied to other similar hash constructions with
two cascaded branches. As a result, a good design of a hash
function should take this attack into consideration.
REFERENCES
[1] Lin Pin, Wu Wen-Ling, Wu Chuan-Kun. Hash Functions Based on Block
Ciphers. In Journal of Software, Vol.20, pp. 682-691, 2005
[2] Antoine Joux. Multicollisions in Iterated Hash Functions-Application
to Cascaded Constructions. In CRYPTO’04, LNCS 3152, pp. 306-316,
2004
[3] John Kelsey and Bruce Schneier. Second preimages on n-bit hash
functions for much less than 2n work. In EUROCRYPT, LNCS 3494,
pp. 474C490, 2005.
[4] S. Hirose. Some Plausible Constructions of Double-Block-Length Hash
Functions. In FSE 2006, LNCS 4047, pp. 210-225, 2006.
[5] S. Lucks. A Failure-Friendly Design Principle for Hash Functions. In
ASIACRYPT 2005, LNCS 3788, pp. 474-494, 2005.
[6] A. Bogdanov, G. Leander, C. Paar, A. Poschmann, M.J.B. Robshaw
and Y. Seurin, Hash Functions and RFID Tags: Mind the Gap. In
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2008, LNCS
5154, pp. 283-299, 2008.
[7] Zheng Gong, Pieter H. Hartel, Svetla Nikova and Bo Zhu, Towards
Secure and Practical MACs for Body Sensor Networks. In Progress in
Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2009, LNCS 5922, pp. 182-198, 2009.
[8] X. Wang, Y. Yin and H. Yu. Finding Collision in the Full SHA-1. In
CRYPTO’05, LNCS 3621, pp. 17-36, 2005.
[9] X. Wang and H. Yu. How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions. In
EUROCRYPT’05, LNCS 3494, pp. 19-35, 2005.
[10] I. Damgard. A Design Principle for Hash Functions, In Advances in
Cryptology-Crypto’89, LNCS 435, pp. 416-427, 1989.
[11] R.C. Merkle. One way hash functions and DES. In Advances in
Cryptology -Crypto’89, LNCS 435, pp. 428-446, 1989.
[12] Rivest R. The MD4 message-digest algorithm. In CRYPTO’90, LNCS
537, pp. 303-311, 1991.
[13] Rivest R. The MD5 message-digest algorithm. Internet Activity Board,
Internet Privacy Task Force, RFC1321, 1992.
[14] FIPS 180-1. Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing
Standar, Publication 180-1. NIST, 1995.
[15] FIPS 180-2. Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing
Standar, Publication 180-2. NIST, 2003.
[16] B.Preneel, R. Govaerts, and J. Vandewalle. Hash functions based on
block ciphers: A synthetic approach. In Advances in Cryptology -
Crypto’93, LNCS 773, pp. 368-378, 1994.
[17] B.O. Brachtl, D.Coppersmith, M.M. Hyden, S.M. Matyas, C.H. Meyer,
J. Oseas, S. Pilpel, and M. Schilling. Data Authentication Using Modifi-
cation Detection Codes Based on a Public One Way Encryption Funstion.
U.S. Patent Number 4,908,861, March 13, 1990.
[18] W. Hohl, X. Lai, T. Meier, and C. Waldvogel. Security of iterated hash
function based on block ciphers. In CRYPTO’93, LNCS 773, pp. 379-
390, 1993.
[19] L. Brown, J. Pieprzyk, and J. Seberry. LOKI-a cryptographic primitive
for authentication and secrecy applications. In J. Severry and J. Pieprzyk
(Eds): Advances in Cryptology-AusCrypt’90, LNCS 453, pp. 229-236,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1990.
[20] Richared D. Dean. Formal Aspects of Mobile Code Security. Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University, 1999.
[21] Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman. A Framework for Iterative Hash Functions:
HAIFA. In Proceedings of Second NIST Cryptographic Hash Workshop,
2006.
